Do floating ceilings solve the usury rate problem? by Jean M. Lovati & R. Alton Gilbert
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OST states set maximum limits on interest rates
which lenders may charge on residential mortgage
loans. These usury laws are intended to protect bor-
rowers from “exorbitant” interest rates which lenders
might charge in the absence of such legal controls.
Advocates of usury ceilings often express concern for
borrowers who have little knowledge of prevailing in-
terest rates or few alternative sources of credit.1
In most states, usury ceilings on conventional resi-
dential mortgage loans are set at fixed levels by state
laws. When market interest rates rise above the usury
ceilings, many individuals cannot find lenders who
will finance their home purchases. Also, during such
periods residential construction declines relative to
that in states not subject to such restrictive usury
ceilings.
In recent years several states have raised their
usury ceilings, eliminated usury ceilings entirely, or
adopted floating ceilings which change periodical!>’
as other interest rates change. Floating usury ceilings
are intended to protect individual borrowers from
unusually high interest rates, while avoiding disrup-
tions in the credit flow to home buyers and reductions
in residential construction which can result when
market interest rates approach or exceed usury ceil-
ings. This paper evaluates whether floating usury
rate formulas recently adopted by various states will
avoid impeding the flow of credit to home buyers.
1For a discussion of arguments in favor of usuiy ceilings, see
Norman N. Bowsher, “Usury Laws: Harmful When Effective,
this Review (August 1974), pp. 16-23, and Harold C. Nathan,
“Economic Analysis of Usury Laws A Survey,” Working
Paper 78-7, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
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Lenders typically make investments which, they
hope, will maximize their profits. Consequently, they
shift their assets among various investments in re-
sponse to changes in relative rates of return, For
instance, if yields on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds
rise relative to yields on residential mortgages, lenders
will reduce their mortgage investments and increase
their holdings of government bonds. In so doing, they
bring relative rates of return back in line.
In addition, lenders can choose to invest in resi-
dential mortgages on properties in different parts of
the country. In the absence of usury ceilings, mort-
gage interest rates in any section of the country can-
not deviate too much from the national average rate
for long. Lenders will make more credit available
in areas with relatively high jnterest rates.
Lenders usually are willing to make more risky
mortgage loans if borrowers adequately compensate
them for those risks by paying higher interest rates.
This trade-off between risk and interest rates can be
illustrated for the ratio of mortgage loan to house
price, one aspect of risk. Since lenders assume owner-
ship of mortgaged property if borrowers default on
mortgage payments, the ratio of the loan to the
market value of the house is an important consid-
eration in evaluating risk. Lenders will make loans
which are larger relative to the prices of homes being
purchased if borrowers will pay sufficiently higher
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interest rates to compensate for the greater risks.
Thus, lenders do not treat mortgage loans as a homo-
geneous type of asset; they attach various degrees of
risk to individual loans, depending upon borrowers’
personal circumstances, credit histories, and prefer-
ence for loan terms. The nature of the properties to
be mortgaged also affects risk, differing with the
prospects for depreciation in market value.
These mortgage market characteristics indicate that




The average level of interest rates on new resi
dentin! mortgages will fluctuate with changes in
other long-term interest rates,
Interest rates on new residential mortgages will
tend to be similar in different parts of the coun-
try, when adjusted for differences in the riskiness
of loans, and
(3) Interest rates on new residential mortgages will
vary in a given area, depending upon risk
characteristics.
As Chart I indicates, yields on conventional resi-
dential mortgages do change over time as changes in
other long-term interest rates occur. The somewhat
fixed differentials between these interest rates reflect
the investors’ perceptions of differential risks and
transactions costs on these types of investments.2
A recent study reports that the range of mortgage
interest rates among metropolitan areas averages
about 75 basis points. However, the study’ also re-
2
For evidence that lenders shift assets between residential mort-
gage loans and other long-term investments when rela-
tive interest rates change, see William L. Silber, Portfolio
Behavior of Financial Institutions (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, Irc., 1970, pp. 18-56). Silber found evidence
of such behavior for mutual savings banks, pension plans,
life insurance companies, and property and casualty insur-
ance companies. lie did riot find evidence of such substitution
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average mortgage interest rates in individual metro-
politan areas remain close to national average interest
rates over time, when interest rates in those areas
are not constrained by usury ceilings.
Several studies find that, during a given period of
time, the interest rates charged by mortgage lenders
depend upon the risks and costs associated with in-
dividual loans. In general, mortgage interest rates
tend to be higher on loans which are a larger per-
centage of the purchase price of the house, and lower
on loans with longer maturities and for homes of
higher dollar value.4 One study also found that char-
acteristics of the property influenced the mortgage
interest rate, with a higher interest rate for a property
in poorer physical condition or in a neighborhood
with greater risk of depreciation in value.5
3Mark Meador, “Interregional Mortgage Rate Differentials,”
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal (September 1978),
pp. 2-6.
4
1n one study, a researcher applied for mortgage loans at a
sample of savings and loan associations (S&Ls) and commer-
cial banks in the Chicago area, providing each lender with
the same personal information and description of the house
to be purchased. The study was conducted in 1960 and re-
peated in 1985. In both years he found variation in interest
rates among lenders when proposing the same down payment.
He also found that individual lenders offered to lend at
lower interest rates if he wished to make a larger down pay-
ment. See Allen F. Jung, “Terms on Conventional Mortgage
Loans — 1985 vs. 1980,” National Banking Review (March
1966), pp. 379-84, Another study was based on a survey of
individual mortgage loans made by a sample of S&Ls and
commercial banks in the Chicago area from April 1960
through July 1963. Mortgage interest rates were found to
be higher on loans with higher ratios of loan to purchase
price, lower on loans with longer maturities, and lower on
loans for homes of higher dollar value. Mortgage interest
rates also were found to be lower at lenders with greater
total assets, and varied systematically by location of lenders
within the Chicago area. See Alfred N. Page, “The Variation
of Mortgage Interest Rates,” Journal of Business (July 1964),
pp. 286-94. For additional evidence on interest rate differen-
tials on residential mortgages, see Jack M. Guttentag, “Changes
in the Structure of the Residential Mortgage Market: Analysis
and Proposals,” Appendix A, in Irwin Friend, ed., Study of
the Savings and Loan Industry, Vol. IV (Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, July 1969), pp. 1545-56. Loan commitment data
reported by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board show that
interest rates on mortgage loans with loan-to-price ratios of 95
percent are 40 to 50 basis points above rates on loans with
loan-to-price ratios of 75 percent. See Stephen T. Zahrenski,
“New Measures of Mortgage Rates and Lending Policies,”
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal (June 1978), pp.
14-19.
5
This study used data on about 550 residential mortgage loans
made by one large S&L in California from 1967 through 1971.
The interest rate on each mortgage was measured as the differ-
ence between the effective interest rate on the loan and the
average interest rate that the S&L was charging at the time
the loan was made. That measure of the interest rate was used
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Studies of delinquencies and defaults on residential
mortgages indicate that lenders have a sound statis-
tical basis for assigning different risks to mortgage
loans, based upon characteristics of borrowers and
loan terms. One study found the following factors
positively related to incidence of delinquency (loans
90 days or more in arrears) in mortgage payments:
(1) Ratio of the loan to the purchase price of the
house
(2) Occupation of borrower, with delinquency lower
for professionals, executives, and managers, and
higher for salespersons
(3) Number of dependents.°
Another study on defaults on FHA-insured home
mortgages finds that the incidence of default is posi-
tively related to both maturity of loans and loan-to-
value ratios, and negatively related to borrowers’
income.7
A recent study by the U.S. League of Savings Asso-
ciations indicates that the relatively young with mod-
erate to low incomes are primarily the borrowers who
buy their first homes with low percentage down pay-
ment loans (see Table I). As indicated in the studies
cited above, these are the borrowers most likely to
become delinquent or default on their mortgage loans,
and, consequently, they are charged higher mortgage
interest rates.
as the dependent variable in regression analysis. The authors
found that mortgage interest rates were positively related to
the ratio of the amount of the loan to the appraisal value of
the home to be purchased, and negatively related to maturity
and dollar amount of the loan. The authors also found that
characteristics of the property to be mortgaged influence the
mortgage interest rate. Dummy variables for properties in
neighborhoods with poorer prospects for appreciation in value
and for properties in poorer physical condition had positive
regression coefficients which were statistically significant. See
Richard L. Sander and Howard E. Sosin, “The Determinants
of Mortgage Risk Premiums: A Case Study of the Portfolio of
a Savings and Loan Association,” Journal of Business (January
1975), pp. 27-38.
GJohe P. Herzog and James P. Earley, Home Mortgage Delin-
quency and Foreclose (New York: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1970).
7
George M. Von Furstenberg, “Default Risk on FHA-Insured
Home Mortgages as a Function of the Terms of Financing:
A Quantitative Analysis,” Journal of Finance (June 1969),
pp. 459-77, and “Risk Structure and the Distribution of Bene-
fits Within the FHA Home Mortgage Insurance Program,”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (August 1970), pp.
303-22.
ports that about half of the variation in mortgage
interest rates can be explained by loan terms and
usury ceilings. After adjusting for these factors, the
range of unexplained variation in interest rates is
only about 25 basis points.3 Chart II indicates that
As mortgage interest rates in a state rise closer
to a fixed usury ceiling, two general effects occur.FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS APRIL 1979
- strictive usury ceilings indirectly charge
Iabe I higher effective interest rates through
Distribution of First-Time Home Buyers by Age, Income, higher closing costs. This indicates that
and Percentage Down Payment on Mortgage Loans’ lenders circumvent usury ceilings to
Down payment as a perceniage of home purchase price - some extent by charging higher loan fees
Percentage when contract interest rates are restricted
Age of 5.1% 10.1% ~ ti~c.t~se by usury ceilings. However, other results
fi,st-time to to than buyers in uf this study indicate that lenders do not
home buyers 5.0% 10.0% 19.9% 20% age qraup
Iullv circumvent usury ceilings by charg-
18 to 29 5.5% 26.2% 20.0% 51.7% 62.9% ing higher fees, since usury ceilings in-
30 to 39 5.9 19.6 17.0 42.5 26.2 fluence other loan terms. In particular,
40 to 49 4.3 16.8 13.0 34.1 7.0 lenders require larger percentage down
50 and over 0.8 11.0 10.2 22.0 3.9 payments when market interest rates rise
near or above usury ceilings. Borrowers
Down payment as a percentage of home purchase price .. - —. — unable to meet the higher percentage
Pe”centaqe
Annual Total of first- down payments are rationed out of the
income of s.i% 10.1% less time home market.°
first-time to to than buyers in
home buyers 5.0% 10.0% 19.9% 20% incame qroup
— ..____ _._._ . The second predicted effect of usury
Less than $15,000 5.6% 23.2% is.c% 44.7% 22.0% ceilings — a decline in mortgage lending
$15,000-524,999 6.4 27.4 20.7 54.1 49.3 in a state with a relatively low usury
$25,000-$34,999 4.6 18.8 54.) 40.7 18.3
cedmg when market interest rates in
535,000 or mare 2.9 11.6 49.3 29.3 10.4
—--. other states nse above the usury ceiling
u,,n nat fans] survey ni P.lr’fl p.srrhi-e’ .,~ s’,glc.rarnl) ..~,.. , — is substantiated by studies of mort—
c’s,ssves:ti. nd t,.nge: s~tcas •~5 ~rcI IuLnL-,’ :_-.n-.L,—:s,w l:fl, gage lending in Georgia, New York, and
5511 RCi’ : !Icor.r..r,.,, s)’;p: :Ijj’.rdier, 0., Ssnu’~-jsushi ii’.mt. L S. Leanis,, sr Ss~s:.’e Pennsylvania)0 Other studies report that
.\ssuc ut,. si. Ec’ss.o,nscp. LIL-;.a’lmLnL
usury ceilings affect residential construc-
tion activity. Housing starts or permits
First, some borrowers are rationed out of the market in states with relatively low usury rates decline be-
because lenders are not permitted to charge above- tween 11 and 20 percent for each 100 basis point rise
average interest rates to compensate themselves for in market interest rates relative to usury ceilings.11
additional risk. Only lower-risk borrowers, such as
those who have accumulated sufficient savings to
make higher percentage down payments, or those 9Such rationing occurred m Canada dunng 1963-67, when
buying houses in neighborhoods with less nsk of maximum rates on government-insured mortgages were set
depreciation in market value, receive credit. administratively, generally below interest rates on conventional
mortgages. Dunng this penod, only about 13 percent of
mortgages insured by the Canadian govermnent were made
Second, as interest rates on alternative long-term to individuals in the bottom third of the income distribution,
investments rise relative to the state’s usury ceiling compared to 30 percent during 1971-75 when the ceiling
was removed entirely. Lawrence B. Smith, An Analysis or
(and as average mortgage interest rates in other states the Effects of the Removal of the Yield Ceiling on Federall
rise above the local ceiling rate), residential mort- Insured Mortgages in Canada,” Journal of Finance (Marc
1977), pp. 195-201.
gage lending will declme relative to that in states
not subject to such restrictive limits on interest rates. ‘°CharlesL, France, “Pennsylvania’s Floating Usury Ceiling:
Since mortgage financing is essential for most home ~ t9~ ~es~ti~
buyers, home building activity in states subject to Carmen J. Carlo, and Bernard Kaye, “The Impact of New
relatively low usury ceilings will decline relative to ~
that in other states. James E. McNulty, “A Reexamination of the Problem of
State Usury Ceilings: The Impact in the Mortgage Market,”
One recent study confirms the first effect of usury n~97~aper #21, Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
ceilings on loan terms.8 When market interest rates
rise above usury ceilings, lenders in states with re- ttOstas, “Effects of Usury Ceilings”; Philip K. Robins, “The
Effects of State Usury Ceilings on Single Family Home-
building,” Journal of Finance (March 1974), pp. 227-35;
and Kenneth Rosen, “The Impact of State Usury Laws on
SJames B. Ostas, “Effects of Usury Ceilings in the Mortgage the Housing Finance System and on New Residential Con-
Market,” Journal of Finance (June 1976), pp. 821-34. struction,” Princeton University, 1978.
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In recent years several states have established usury
ceilings which are automatically adjusted at frequent
intervals to changes in other interest rates (see Table
II). Floating ceilings are intended to avoid the harm-
ful effects of fixed ceilings on home financing and
residential construction, while still protecting bor-
rowers from possible “exorbitant” interest rates. These
floating usury ceilings are tied to various interest
rates, the most common being yields on long-term
U.S. Government bonds and the Federal Reserve dis-
count rate.
~:5- ~-~~r/
One issue that concerns advocates of usury ceil-
ings is whether lenders would always charge the
maximum interest rate permissible on residential mort-
gages. Finance companies which make small loans
to individuals often charge the maximum interest
rates allowed by states and raise their loan rates when-
ever the usury limits are raised. Do lenders in the
residential mortgage market respond similarly when
floating usury ceilings rise?
Chart II provides evidence on this issue. Usury
ceilings and average mortgage interest rates are
plotted for five metropolitan areas in states which
have had floating usury ceilings for several years.’2
The chart for the Cleveland, Ohio, area requires
special explanation, since average mortgage interest
rates were above the usury ceiling during 1974-77.
Savings and loan associations are exempt from the
Ohio usury law, and, therefore, can make mortgage
loans at interest rates above the usury ceiling. The
same explanation applies to mortgage interest rates
for Columbus, Ohio, in 1977, when the survey of mort-
gage interest rates began for that area. Since the
second half of 1977, the usury ceiling has been above
average mortgage interest rates, which indicates that
the rates lenders charge are not determined by the
‘2The mortgage interest rates are those on existing homes,
which tend to be higher than mortgage rates on newly-built
homes. Using the higher of these average interest rates is
appropriate in determining whether lenders always charge
interest rates equal to the legal maximums, because it
intentionally biases the observations in the direction of find-
ing such a pattern. Average mortgage interest rates for the
Philadelphia area are based upon a high percentage of mort-
gage loans made by lenders outside of Pennsylvania. There-
tore, observations are not presented for the Philadelphia area.
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floating usury ceiling. Average mortgage interest rates
in Cleveland and in Columbus were approximately
the same as the national average, both when mort-
gage rates in those two cities were above the usury
ceiling and when they were below.
In the Chicago area, mortgage interest rates appar-
ently were constrained lower than national average
mortgage rates in the first half of 1974 by the 8 per-
cent usury ceiling. Contract interest rates were equal
to or below the usury ceiling, but effective interest
rates were slightly higher due to initial fees. Since
early 1975, average mortgage interest rates in the
Chicago area have been below the state usury ceil-
ing, following closely the national average mortgage
interest rate.
Mortgage rates in Minneapolis were substantially
below national average interest rates until early 1976,
when the state usury rate was allowed to float at 2
percentage points above the yield on ten-year U.S.
Treasury bills.’3 Since then, average mortgage interest
rates in the Minneapolis area have been below the
usury ceiling and have followed the national average
mortgage interest rate. The same pattern holds for
Pittsburgh, with average mortgage interest rates in
that area remaining substantially below the floating
usury ceiling for Pennsylvania since 1977.
Use of a floating usury ceiling will avoid problems
- in mortgage financing which occasionally result with
fixed ceilings only if the floating rate remains above
the mortgage interest rates that would prevail in the
absence of usury ceilings,Relationships among interest
rates vary over time, and, therefore, a floating usury
rate which is currently above mortgage interest rates
may be below in the future. Also, a floating ceiling
which remains above national average mortgage rates
may not be high enough to enable relatively high-risk
borrowers to obtain funds.
The prospects for the various floating usury ceilings
to remain above mortgage interest rates in the future
can be assessed by examining past relationships be-
tween interest rates on conventional residential mort-
13
For a few months in 1974 and 1975, average contract interest
rates on conventional residential mortgages on existing homes
in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area were above 8 percent. This
is probably due to an exemption from the usury laws for
loans of $100,000 or more, and loans by some national banks
at 1 percentage point above the Federal Reserve discount
rate, a permissible interest rate for national banks. The dis-
count rate was above 7 percent during that period.
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gages and interest rates to which the floating rates
are tied. Most floating ceilings have been adopted
only since 1974. Suppose, however, they had been in
effect since 1983. Would the implied usury ceilings
calculated from the floating rate formulas have been
higher than the average interest rates on conventional
residential mortgages since 1963?14
Results of comparisons of implied nsnry ceilings to
mortgage interest rates are presented in the last three
columns of Table II. The first of these columns gives
the number of months since January 1963 when the
implied floating usury ceilings are equal to or below
the national average interest rate on conventional
mortgages for newly-built homes. This table indicates
that some states have set their floating usnry ceilings
too low to avoid disruptions in the flow of credit to
home buyers. These observations are especially perti-
nent for Vermont and West Virginia, which have set
their floating rate formulas so low that the implied
usury ceilings are below the national average interest
rates on conventional mortgages for most months
since 1963,15
Restrictions on the speed with which floating usury
rates are allowed to adjust to changes in market
interest rates also create potential problems in home
financing. Iowa restricts the speed of adjustment in
its floating rate by setting its usury ceiling quarterly,
at 2 percentage points above the yield on ten-year
U.S. Treasury bonds. The implied usury rates calcu-
lated for Iowa are below the conventional mortgage
interest rate for six months since 1963. If the floating
ceiling rate for Iowa were set monthly instead of
quarterly, the implied usury rate would have been
below the national average mortgage rate for only
one month since January 1963.
The floating usury rate formula recently adopted
by New York state restricts the speed of adjustment
~
4
These comparisons may understate the effects of usury ceil-
ings on the flow of credit to home buyers, since some of the
mortgage interest rates incorporated in the national average
rate were at times constrained by usury ceilings. One study
reports that when interest rates are relatively low, the aver-
age mortgage interest rates in areas with relatively high
usury ceilings are approximately equal to the national aver-
age rate, hut when interest rates are high, increases in the
national average rate lag behind the increases in areas with
relatively high usury ceilings. See McNulty, “A Reexainina~
tioa of the Problem of State Usury Ceilings,’ pp. 5-9.
t5
Two other states with implied floating usury ceihngs which
were below mortgage interest rates for a substantial number
of months are North Dakota and Ohio. - However, those
states make exceptimu for S&Ls. In North Dakota, S&Ls are
subject to a 12 percent usury ceiling, and in Ohio, S&Ls are
exempt from the usury ceiling. Therefore, the major effect
of usury ceilings on residential mortgages in these states is
to determine which financial institutions make mortgage
loans during certain periods.
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to other interest rates even more than that of IosvaY~
Under the New York law, the usury rate will be set
quarterly at 2 percentage points above the yield
on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds, but increases in the
usury rate from one quarter to the next may be no
greater than 25 basis points. The implied usury rates
based upon the New York specification are equal to
or less than mortgage interestrates for nineteen months
over the period since 1963, more than three times as
often as for Iowa which does not limit the quarterly
changes in its usury rate.
Minnesota has another type of restriction on the
speed of adjustment of its usury ceiling. The floating
ceiling is adjusted monthly to a level 2 percentage
points above the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury
bonds, but rounded to the nearest 25 basis points. If,
for instance, the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds
is 8.12 percent, the usury ceiling in Minnesota is 10
percent; with a ten-year bond yield of 8.13 percent,
the usury ceiling is 10.25 percent. Rounding to the
nearest 25 basis points tends to delay the rise in the
usury ceiling when long-term interest rates are rising,
and to delay the decline in the usury ceiling when
long-term rates are declining. Since January 1963, the
implied usury ceiling for Minnesota is less than the
national average mortgage interest rate for six months,
whereas it would have been below for only one month
without rounding to the nearest 25 basis points.
To some extent these restrictions on the speed of
adjustment defeat the purpose for having a floating
usury rate. The restrictions occasionally cause the
implied floating usury rates for Iowa, Minnesota, and
New York to be below mortgage interest rates when
long-term interest rates are rising rapidly.
The relatively low usury ceiling in Ohio during
1976-77 illustrates the problem with tying a usury
ceiling to the Federal Reserve discount rate. When
Ohio initially adopted the floating usury ceiling in
November 1975, the usury rate was increased 100
basis points to only 25 basis points below the national
average mortgage interest rate. However, the gap
between the usury rate and the national average
mortgage rate began to widen almost immediately, as
the Federal Reserve twice lowered the discount rate
during 1976. Two major problems with tying usury
ceilings on residential mortgage interest rates to the
discount rate are these: 1) the Federal Reserve gen-
erally adjusts the discount rate to changes in short-
term market interest rates, whereas mortgages are
10
The New York usury ceiling on residential mortgages was
recently raised to 9.50 percent, and beginning May 1, 1979,
will be set quarterly according to a floating rate formula.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS APRIL 1979
long-term investments, and there often are large gaps
between short-term and long-term interest rates, and
2) at times, the discount rate, being set by adminis-
trative action and not by market forces, is allowed
to remain out of line with other interest rates.
The potential for the floating usury rates to create
mortgage financing problems for relatively high-risk
borrowers can be assessed by adding 25 to 50 basis
points to the average conventional mortgage rate on
newly-built homes, and comparing that interest rate
to the implied floating ceilings for each month since
1963. Two recent studies indicate that a state’s usury
ceiling must be at least 50 basis points above the
national average mortgage interest rate in order to
avoid impeding the flow of credit to relatively high-
risk borrowers.17
For several states, the floating usury rates are al-
most always above the average mortgage rate, but
are below the average mortgage rate plus 25 basis
points for a substantial number of months. Of course,
the differences are even greater with 50 basis points
added. The frequency with which implied usury
ceilings are below the average mortgage interest rate
plus 50 basis points is especially great for states with
restrictions on the speed of adjustment of their floating
rates. For instance, the average mortgage interest rate
plus 50 basis points is above the implied usury rate
for New York about 80 percent of the time since
1963, and above the implied usury ceiling in Min-
nesota about 65 percent of the time. Thus, floating
usury ceilings in several states are likely to ration
relatively high-risk borrowers out of the mortgage
market much of the time. This is substantiated by a
study of Minnesota’s floating usury ceiling which
reports that conventional mortgage loans in that state
continue to have relatively high percentage down
payments since the floating ceiling was adopted.’8
In contrast, states with usury ceilings 2.50 per-
centage points above yields on long-term U.S. Govern-
ment bonds, or 5 percentage points above the Federal
Reserve discount rate, and no restrictions on the
speed of response of usury ceilings to changes in
tt
One study finds that Georgia’s usury ceiling begins to affect
mortgage loan originations by savings and loan associations
in Georgia when the market interest rate on mortgages rises
to within 50 basis points of the usury ceiling. McNulty, “A
Reexamination of the Problem of State Usury Ceilings.” A
survey of interest rates on loan commitments finds that in-
terest rates on loans with loan-to-price ratios of 95 percent
are 40 to 50 basis points above those on loans with loan-to-
price ratios of 75 percent. Zabrenski, “New Measures of
Mortgage Rates and Lending Policies.”
58
David S. DahI, Stanley L. Graham, and Arthur J. Rolnick,
“Minnesota’s Usury Law: A Reevaluation, Ninth District
Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (Spring
1977), pp. 1-6.
the interest rates to which they are tied, are almost
always above the national average mortgage interest
rate. This result holds even with additional basis
points added to the average mortgage rate to allow
for a risk premium for loans with higher-risk charac-
teristics.19 These appear to be the minimum differen-
tials above the yields on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds
and the Federal Reserve discount rate which are nec-
essary to avoid impeding the flow of credit to home
buyers.
Since fixed usury ceilings on residential mortgage
interest rates, at times, have had adverse effects on
home financing and residential construction, several
states recently have adopted floating usury rates in an
attempt to avoid these adverse effects when mort-
gage interest rates rise. These floating usury rates are
increased or decreased in specified relationships to
variou~other interest rates, the most common being
yields on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds and the Fed-
eral Reserve discount rate.
Two issues are raised concerning the effects of the
floating usury rates. The first is whether mortgage
interest rates equal the floating usury ceilings. In
general, average mortgage interest rates charged by
lenders in areas subject to floating usury ceilings re-
main approximately equal to national average mort-
gage interest rates, not the floating usury ceilings.
The other issue is whether the floating usury rates
adopted by various states have been set high enough
to remain above national average interest rates on res-
idential mortgages over time. Based upon past relation-
ships between mortgage interest rates and the other
interest rates to which the floating usury ceilings are
tied, floating usury rates for a few states were below
national average mortgage interest rates for substan-
tial periods of time. Floating usury ceilings in several
additional states are set so close to average mortgage
interest rates that relatively high-risk borrowers will
frequently be rationed out of the market for conven-
tional residential mortgages. In contrast, states with
usury rates set 2.50 percentage points above yields on
ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds or 5 percentage points
above the Federal Reserve discount rate appear to
have set their usury ceilings high enough to avoid
impeding the flow of credit to home buyers.
‘~Theresult also holds for Tennessee’s recently adopted floating
ceiling (effective May 1, 1979) set at 2 percentage points
above the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)
auction rate on conventional mortgages. The implied floating
ceiling for Tennessee is above the conventional mortgage rate
plus 50 basis points since 1972, when the FNMA series
began.
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